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abstraCt
Debates about political correctness often proceed as if proponents see nothing 
to fear in erecting norms that inhibit expression on the one side, and opponents see 
nothing but misguided efforts to silence political enemies on the other.1 both views 
are mistaken. Political correctness, as I argue, is an important attempt to advance the 
legitimate interests of certain groups in the public sphere. However, this type of norm 
comes with costs that mustn’t be neglected–sometimes in the form of conflict with 
other values we hold dear, but often by creating an internal schism that threatens us 
with collective irrationality. Political correctness thus sets up dilemmas I wish to set 
out (but not, alas, resolve). the cliché is that political correctness tramples on rights 
to free-speech, as if the potential loss were merely expressive; the real issue is that in 
filtering public discourse, political correctness may defeat our own substantive aims.
WHat Is PolItICal CorreCtness?
Political correctness, as I will understand it, is the attempt to establish norms 
of speech (or sometimes behavior) that are thought to (a) protect vulnerable, mar-
ginalized or historically victimized groups, and which (b) function by shaping public 
discourse, often by inhibiting speech or other forms of social signaling, and that (c) 
are supposed to avoid insult and outrage, a lowered sense of self-esteem, or otherwise 
offending the sensibilities of such groups or their allies. the concept, we should note, 
is one used by its enemies; dubbing something politically incorrect implies there is 
something worrisome or objectionable at work, though not necessarily that the po-
1. earlier philosophical debates illustrate this. see, e.g., Friedman and narveson 1995
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litically correct option is wrong all things considered. but to avoid verbal disputes, 
let us simply take on board the language of “political correctness” and concentrate on 
the substantive merits of the doubts that are implicit in the pejorative tone.
according to this characterization, merely advocating for substantive policy 
changes is not itself a reflection of political correctness, except in a vague, by-associa-
tion sense of the term. Criticizing someone for referring to an administrative assistant 
as a “secretary” is a manifestation of political correctness, but advocating for higher 
wages for assistants is not; insisting on trigger-warnings on syllabi or deleting offend-
ing material is again a form of political correctness, but arguing for rape-prevention 
security measures is not. Certain fringe environmental positions might themselves be 
loosely dubbed “PC” views, but I suspect this is only because the people who adopt 
such positions often advocate politically correct norms alongside. symmetrically, it 
isn’t politically incorrect to make a donation to fight gay marriage–though of course 
many would respond to doing so with outrage–but it is politically incorrect to write 
an op-ed making a careful, dispassionate argument against gay marriage. Political 
correctness thus isn’t about private choices deviating from some norm; the notion 
doesn’t refer to a distinctive personal morality, but to a system for moulding public 
discourse.
the norms involved are mainly, if not universally, negative and inhibitive, and 
many cases that initially seem positive are more complex, as when campus advocates 
urge multicultural curricula that move away from the Western canon, or argue for 
including more women or members of various other categories on syllabi, which 
doesn’t initially seem inhibiting. but the underlying goal, even in these cases, is to 
avoid the sense that certain groups are marginalized or devalued because members 
of their group aren’t represented in the canon or syllabus. What is being resisted 
in this kind of case is a certain implication that would otherwise inform public dis-
course, an implication that proponents of political correctness wish to eliminate. 
We might worry that this isn’t what is happening when people simply point out that 
the bronze Head from Ife, say, has intrinsic aesthetic merit that warrants study on 
par with comparable european art, but then this doesn’t look much like an appeal 
to political correctness. the account, it’s important to emphasize, isn’t supposed to 
capture just any revisionary or vaguely “left” policy, but rather those with the flavor 
of responding to the sensibilities of marginalized groups by blocking an offending 
element. Making a case for the Ife head as envisioned above is an aesthetic argument 
motivated by independent, positive enthusiasm for the features of the work; appeal-
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ing to the negative effects on the self-esteem of certain students when asked to study 
Phidias, Michelangelo and Picasso is an appeal to political correctness. the same goes 
for historians’ arguments for the revision of inaccurately jingoistic textbooks versus 
those concerned with avoiding any implication that certain groups are inferior or 
that their grievances aren’t worth addressing. (of course, the distinction can be a dif-
ficult one to draw).
on this definition, moreover, it is significant that what makes a statement po-
litically incorrect is not whether it in fact serves to promote the interests of certain 
people overall, but whether it threatens their public standing, as typically manifest-
ed in a sense of insult and outrage, or a lowered sense of self-esteem and inclusion. 
notice, for instance, that no one is willing to retract judgments about what look like 
politically incorrect statements if they later turn out to promote the interests of the 
groups in question. If the president of the university says “Members of group G are 
underrepresented in field F because of unflattering trait t” this may well be judged 
politically incorrect, and that judgment won’t change if it turns out that this was just 
what G needed to hear. the objective likelihood of advancing the cause of G is beside 
the point when it comes to political correctness. the air of political incorrectness is 
brought about by the insult itself, and thus the usual way of overcoming substantive 
criticism–by showing that the local harm of the insult was outweighed–is ineffective. 
Calling someone by some group-epithet does not become less politically incorrect if 
that turns out to be motivating and helpful to the individual, as insulting a friend at 
a tennis match (“Come on, you jerk!”) can evade criticism if it turns out to be helpful 
overall. that is because the target of political correctness is the insult itself (along 
with the corresponding threat to the public standing of the group), not the overall 
interests of the people involved.
this might be resisted on grounds that there is evidence of “stereotype threat,” 
i.e., that issuing politically incorrect statements like the university president’s often 
negatively impact the actual performance of members of marginalized groups, simply 
by raising the salience of their group-membership and the perception that members 
are less good at a given task. (subtly reminding test-takers that they are members of 
a marginalized group can cause them to perform worse than control groups that take 
the same test without a priming-cue.)2 My characterization may then seem falsely to 
suggest that the concern is for something trivial-sounding (“not hurting people’s feel-
2.  For a summary and discussion, see Gendler 2011, 48-51. see also research on the possible impact 
of emphasizing native talent or brilliance, leslie et al. 2015. 
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ings”) whereas the ultimate concern is to prevent the real and documented damage 
that the relevant speech and behavior does. However, my claim is not that politi-
cally incorrect speech cannot have objectively damaging effects on others, or that 
such effects might not motivate politically correct norms. the idea is that what makes 
something politically incorrect is a certain kind of offense in virtue of undermining 
public standing, not that offending people in such a way need be trivial or that block-
ing such offenses might not have a deeper underlying motivation–just the opposite, 
as we will see.
as a final elaboration, my gloss emphasizes marginalized groups as the intended 
beneficiaries of politically correct norms. It is this aspect that leads me to differ with 
the economist Glenn loury’s otherwise searching analysis. loury treats political cor-
rectness as a far more general phenomenon than I have, suggesting that as “an implicit 
social convention of restraint on public expression, operating within a given commu-
nity” it applies to any such restraint, left or right, including, say, fascist censorship.
(1994 p.430) the key for loury is that political correctness, left or right, culminates in 
a kind of self-censorship through a feedback loop in which, first, there are sanctions 
for those who violate the communal norms, and then those who are willing neverthe-
less to risk such sanctions come to seem especially refractory.
suspicious speech signals deviance because once the practice of punishing those 
who express certain ideas is well established, the only ones who risk ostracism by 
speaking recklessly are those who place so little value on sharing our community that 
they must be presumed not to share our dearest common values.(loury 1994 p.436)
loury emphasizes such examples as the German politician Phillipp Jenninger, 
who fell into disgrace after a speech that engaged rhetorically with the perspective 
of nazi-era Germans, even though it was unambiguously clear that both the speech 
and Jenninger’s prior life and work were devoid of nazi-sympathies or anti-semitism. 
It is worth noting that after loury’s article was published, a Jewish leader gave the 
same speech in a synagogue in order to demonstrate what he rightly predicted would 
be the non-response.(Die Welt 1995) the worry, clearly, wasn’t the substance of what 
Jenninger had to say but the signal, loury would underscore, that is sent by a German 
politician (but not a Jew in a synagogue) being willing to take up, if only for rhetori-
cal purposes, the perspective of nazi-sympathizers after it has been established that 
taking up the nazi-era point of view is taboo.
loury is surely right about the impressive degree of self-censorship political 
correctness can achieve or demand. standard examples examples include the white 
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Washington DC mayoral appointee who abjectly apologized to his colleagues who 
were outraged by his use of the word “niggardly” leading the mayor to accept his res-
ignation. (The Washington Post 1999) but although self-censorship is a kind of ultimate 
victory for those wishing to eliminate some form of expression, actual censorship 
of various sorts is on the table as well. the same term has been the focus of college 
speech codes, as when a student objected to it in an academic setting even after its 
meaning and use by Chaucer were clarified (“It’s not up to the rest of the class to 
decide whether my feelings are valid”). (Reason 1999) and of course it’s natural to 
start with formal censorship in order to induce self-censorship. More importantly, 
I believe there is something distinctively left about political correctness, something 
connected to the concern for victims’ groups. this may sound semantic–loury and 
others could just announce their conception of political correctness is a bit broader 
than mine. but there are important differences between how and why various norms 
shaping public discourse originate and are enforced that are worth recognizing.
take right-wing attempts to delegitimize opposition to war by suggesting dis-
senters are insulting “the brave men and women who fight on our behalf,” or at-
tempts to shape discourse concerning torture by insisting on orwellian euphemisms 
like “enhanced interrogation.” such maneuvers are important to analyze in their own 
right, since they may work to inhibit speech in disastrous ways, often with outcomes 
far worse than anything to emerge from petty squabbles over how to refer to an office 
assistant. but that doesn’t make the cases any less distinct. What motivates these 
right-leaning efforts, baleful though they are, is usually different from and nearly 
opposite to what motivates norms against questioning affirmative action or syllabi 
with too many dead white men. In a typical case, what motivates an effort to suppress 
dissent about war or torture is concern for security, not sympathy or feeling sorry 
for marginalized or oppressed groups. and the target of the norms is typically what 
is seen as a display of weakness rather than insults or offenses against the sensibili-
ties of those marginalized, while the response tends toward contempt for the weak 
rather than outrage at the insult; accusations of disloyalty or spinelessness are more 
likely than those of being insensitive or cruel. there is a common danger that these 
attempts at molding discourse will backfire in ways we’ll explore below, but these 
sub-differences, summarized in the table below, still result in an important overall 
difference in the character of what takes place. (of course, these are just one set of 
possible differences; the right-list would differ for those motivated by a concern for 
individual liberty rather than security.)
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Left Right
Motive sympathy security
Target offense Weakness
Response to violations outrage Contempt
Accusation Cruelty Disloyalty
Danger backfire etc. backfire etc.
Political correctness, then, is far from unique in trying to influence public dis-
course and in trying to compel people to speak or think in certain categories or terms. 
In discussing the problems associated with political correctness we are not singling 
out left-leaning concerns for special scrutiny. all kinds of social institutions, both 
left and right, shape which arguments get made, including libel and national security 
laws, and informal conventions that govern clubs or associations, each with their own 
profile of burdens and benefits. but political correctness is distinctive, and a distinc-
tively left phenomenon, I want to insist. those attempting to shape discourse on the 
right are rarely moved by feeling sorry for some group and rarely make corresponding 
objections focused on avoiding offense. and when they go wrong and undercut their 
own aims, as when their attempts to shape debate about a war turn out to undermine 
national security in the long run, they do so by exhibiting a characteristic series of 
mistakes that are distinct from those most common on the left.
leGItIMate enDs
Political correctness is dismissed by its opponents as if it were either a bizarre and 
trivial insistence on redefining words, or else an insidious attempt to advance an ide-
ology by silencing the competition. “Yes, but…” is not the typical response of those 
with reservations. loury, for example, speaks of the “superficial moralism” of politi-
cal correctness. this certainly applies to cases like “niggardly” that we can dismiss 
as childish. but it is less easy to dismiss the taboo on the n-word itself (herewith ob-
served), harder still to dismiss certain taboos regarding racial science, and impossible, 
I think, to dismiss the underlying worries animating such strictures.
Consider as a historical example the response to the controversial book The 
Bell Curve, which claimed that there is such a thing as general intelligence, that IQ-
differences are partly heritable, that they have a significant effect on social outcomes, 
Volume 4, Issue 1
Dilemmas Of Political Correctness  7
and that there are racial differences in average IQ as measured by a standardized test. 
that reactions to books like The Bell Curve really are manifestations of political cor-
rectness, not just anodyne scientific disagreement (though there was plenty of that as 
well), seems hard to deny. the clearest way of making such a diagnosis is to observe 
that the concern is overwhelmingly rooted in anxiety about offending or insulting a 
historically marginalized group. the key test is how similar research fares that either 
doesn’t insult but rather tends to praise the group in question, or insults but not a 
group that we collectively feel sensitive toward. What is striking is that there is no 
widespread outrage about research into the cognitive advantages that Jews or certain 
asian groups are sometimes said to enjoy (in scoring higher on average on certain 
kinds of tests), or the flipside to such research which is that various european groups 
are inferior in some respect. Here, again, there is plenty of scientific disagreement 
about the validity of the categorizations involved and the specific experiments or tests 
underlying the claims, but there isn’t the collective shock of a taboo being breached 
and the accompanying outrage, what amount to public trials, excommunications, 
and so on.3 Whatever the scientific flaws critics detected in The Bell Curve, political 
correctness is the only plausible explanation for the asymmetric treatment of parallel 
work that just isn’t insulting or else insults groups no one feels much sympathy for.
so much critics of political correctness get right in a case like this. but they 
neglect the perfectly good reasons for cultivating and enforcing various politically 
correct norms. In this instance, the root concern is clearly that there exists a hor-
rific record of violence and injustice directed toward african-americans, as well 
as a record of promoting such violence by superficially respectable means (includ-
ing racial pseudo-science), and enlightened moral thinking has thus converged on 
a default norm against advancing ideas associated with the oppression or marginalization 
of African-Americans. this is why leading responses to The Bell Curve focused on as-
sociating it with earlier instances of debunked racial science.(Gould 1996) Political 
correctness thus represents the evolution of public standards with the praisewor-
thy tendency to protect and promote the interests of historically oppressed groups. 
these standards work by introducing a high barrier of entry to those wishing to enter 
3.  In 1994 The New York Times published an entire series of articles denouncing The Bell Curve, a 
representative opinion piece being “the ‘bell Curve’ agenda” (oct. 24, 1994). by contrast, the times 
headline on research suggesting the heritability of high Jewish IQ scores was “researchers say Intelli-
gence and Disease May be linked in ashkenazic Gene” (June 3, 2005). this piece, too, raised doubts 
about the thesis, but the difference in tenor is obvious from the headlines and the texts themselves. 
New York Magazine published an article entitled “are Jews smarter?”, which also expressed substan-
tive skepticism, but it is hard to imagine a symmetric article with an inverted title about some gentile 
group.
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public discourse in a way that that threatens to undermine moral progress. by main-
taining the norms, we acknowledge that such threats exist and that it is important to 
us collectively to signal to new entrants into public discourse that they must observe 
the norms carved out to protect the status of groups potentially under threat. and 
what is true in this case is true of many other examples of political correctness, such 
as censoring stereotyped depiction of asians, the German anxiety over displays of 
sympathy for national socialism, calls for including more women and other groups 
on syllabi, or suggestions that the poor are to blame for their plight. 
In this respect, I am entirely in agreement with richard rorty that political cor-
rectness has made “the casual infliction of humiliation...much less socially acceptable 
than it was,” and even that “encouraging students to be what mocking neoconser-
vatives call ‘politically correct’ has made our country a far better place.”(rorty 1998 
pp.81-2) there is no denying that norms to avoid insulting or otherwise attacking 
the status of women or gay people have brought huge benefits, and critics of politi-
cal correctness who ignore them are simply mistaken. there are, to be sure, limits 
on the pursuit of these worthy ends, and inevitably disagreement about where to 
locate those borders. barriers to entering the arena of public discourse can be higher 
or lower–at one end of the spectrum are minor conventions and taboos, the sense of 
collective shock when someone “dares” to utter certain things. at the other end are 
explicit laws, say prohibiting hate-speech, which may themselves be narrowly or very 
broadly defined. some Canadian jurisdictions, for example, have made it a human 
rights violation to make any “vexatious comment” known to be “unwelcome by the 
individual or class” on grounds that include “political belief,” which one might rea-
sonably fear as absurdly overbroad.( northwest territories Human rights act, sec. 
14(2), as of 2015.) one may acknowledge the legitimate ends of political correctness 
without endorsing any and all barriers to public discourse. Correspondingly, we may 
resist sticks-and-stones maxims suggesting anything-goes in public discourse while 
symmetrically resisting attempts to shape public discourse by certain agents (such as 
the state) or to certain degrees (refusing to hire anyone who says anything vaguely 
“un-PC”). these may, after all, produce costs or pose dangers in their own right.4 
and of course any particular instance of political correctness may be wrongheaded 
or petty, just as individual applications of patriotic norms. We must not, as rorty 
ultimately does, lose sight of the potential drawbacks to political correctness so as to 
4.  see Waldron 2012 for an argument that the state should in fact pursue heavy-handed tactics 
like hate-speech laws in pursuit of the sort of legitimate ends I have been acknowledging.
Volume 4, Issue 1
Dilemmas Of Political Correctness  9
arrive at a reasonable estimate of what, all-in, we gain and suffer, in upholding these 
norms.
these, then, are legitimate ends for political correctness. Political correctness in 
itself needn’t be mistaken in its fundamental aspirations. Proponents of PC-norms 
aren’t confused to think that racial pseudo-science has had enormous, damaging 
effects in the past; they aren’t mistaken to regard any revival of racial science as po-
tentially disastrous and in any case accompanied by huge costs. It is not true that op-
position to any such revival is (or need be) rooted in mere “superficial moralism,” and 
there are good reasons for maintaining collective default-norms that signal certain 
kinds of discussion out of bounds in the normal course of things. 
there are two wrinkles in this story that bear mentioning, however. one is that 
politically correct norms have a distinctive content that makes emphasis on language 
inevitable. the whole point of such norms, as I have described them, is to gener-
ate a set of default-presumptions that those participating in public discourse are ex-
pected to observe in order to ward off threats to a certain kind of moral progress, and 
so naturally terminology and word-choice features prominently in the marshaling 
of such norms. this can then give rise to the absurd cases already noted that often 
revolve around what really are morally superficial applications of reasonable norms. 
norms pertaining to language-use are perhaps especially liable to misuse in ways that 
will strike some as preposterous since they inevitably implicate what can always be 
ridiculed as “mere” labels. relatedly, we noted that political correctness concerns 
offense and sensibilities, not the objective interests of those involved. It might seem 
surprising that the norm to evolve was one that focused on offense and not simply 
on promoting whatever was in the people’s objective interest. but this is again similar 
to other norms, like love of country. In both cases there is a core goal of promoting 
the interests of some entity, but part of this is taken to involve discouraging insults 
and other threats to the publicly recognized status of the people or thing in ques-
tion. Failing to acknowledge the values in question by a lack of reverence or deviance 
from certain standards are thus punished, even when what is at stake seems superfi-
cially to be only symbolic. Political correctness is one face of a deeper concern for the 
oppressed comparable to the dimension of patriotism associated with denouncing 
insults to country.
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DIleMMas
there is nothing wrong with promoting a presumption that historically op-
pressed or marginalized groups should not be insulted or subjected to discourse 
threatening to undermine their status, and it is puzzling that critics of political cor-
rectness seem frequently unwilling to acknowledge its legitimate ends. that leaves 
the door open to a second kind of criticism, the misguided application of the relevant 
norms, but whatever the damage to individuals losing their jobs or being publicly 
anathematized, it cannot be said that mere misapplication of values raises interesting 
philosophical problems. It is rather a third kind of problem with political correct-
ness that should anchor our attention, the problem of conflicts among values, whether 
between those associated with political correctness and other things we care about, or 
even internal conflicts within the former. We can enumerate several different kinds 
of dilemma-engendering conflicts.
Orwellian discourse: one kind of conflict occurs when politically correct norms 
lead to the kind of abuse of language that orwell criticizes in “Politics of the english 
language.” We noted earlier that the petty misapplication of language-norms isn’t 
worth making a fuss over, but as orwell points out, the vague and imprecise use of 
terms like “fascism” can come to serve as a “defense of the indefensible.”(1946 p.162) 
Contemporary versions of this on the right are easily recognized, as when a kill list 
becomes a “disposition matrix,” but political correctness seems to involve a similar 
tendency. loury draws the connection to phrases like “disadvantaged minorities” 
(nowadays the term would be “diversity”) which he says is “used in educational phi-
lanthropy circles when the speaker really means ‘non-Whites, excluding asians.’…
such linguistic imprecision impairs analysis. but that is often its purpose,” among 
other reasons, he suggests, because announcing that a scholarship was to be offered 
to “non-whites excluding asians” would, by its very accuracy, render the proposal 
impossible.(loury 1996 p.447) another policy-shaping example is the increasing ten-
dency to reject official government terms like “illegal alien” in favor of “undocument-
ed immigrant” or even “undocumented citizen,” with the implication that refusing 
to do so implies reactionary or hateful views. these campaigns aren’t just the one-off 
ideas of random individuals; the phrase “undocumented citizen” is encouraged by 
administrators at a major state university in the United states, and others urge that 
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the statement “america is a melting pot” constitutes a form of “microaggression.”5 
regardless of what the right immigration policy is, and notwithstanding the legiti-
mate interest in avoiding various forms of marginalization, this kind of discourse once 
again “impairs analysis.” “Undocumented immigrant” is meant to make it harder to 
focus on the fact that there are laws and procedures governing entry to the country 
that were flouted by the persons in question, while the orwellian “undocumented 
citizen” seeks to present a political aspiration as a fait accompli. to the extent that 
we recognize both the legitimate ends of political correctness and the undesirable 
effects that orwell drew our attention to, we should see these as cases that present a 
dilemma.
Causal structures: More substantively, fears of politically incorrect stereotyp-
ing threaten to subvert our understanding of the world even without orwellian 
word-games, as when there is resistance in the public sphere to the suggestion that 
a stereotypical trait is causally implicated in some negative outcome. the stereo-
type of deference to authority in many east asian (and other) societies and its role 
in causing accidents is an example.6 When Korean airline flight asiana 214 crashed 
in san Francisco, the suggestion was made that such deference made a difference, 
as the pilot was relatively junior and was being supervised by an instructor, possi-
bly leading the pilot to be reluctant to assert the need for a go-around. this sug-
gestion was in turn widely derided for succumbing to cultural stereotypes. Atlantic 
Monthly author James Fallows, for example, introduced the claim under the heading 
“Confucius in the cockpit,” alongside a comical depiction of the sage, and noted that 
he was, “highly skeptical of this whole line of thinking…If an (apparently) mishan-
dled approach shows something about Korea–or east asia, or Confucius, or rote-
learning systems–then what do we make of the many thousands of asian-piloted 
flights that land smoothly and safely throughout asia every single day?” (Fallows 
2013) needless to say, the safe landings Fallows refers to aren’t reasons to discount or 
mock the suggestion that a trait exhibited with a higher prevalence in some cultures 
5.  “Undocumented citizen” occurs for example in an official publicity campaign of the Univer-
sity of Maryland, which places “illegal alien” alongside expressions like “retarded” and “no homo.” 
http://thestamp.umd.edu/multicultural_involvement_community_advocacy/programs/inclusive_lan-
guage/phrases, accessed 2/3/15. the “microaggression” point is from “tool: recognizing Microag-
gressions and the Messages they send,” part of the materials for a leadership seminar sponsored and 
extensively promoted by UCla. http://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel-programs/programs-
and-initiatives/faculty-diversity-initiatives/faculty-leadership-seminars.html, accessed 7/20/2015. For 
more details, see Volokh 2015.
6.  For a review of how accurate stereotypes are, see lee et al. 1995. the stereotype that stereotypes 
are generally wrong is itself dubious, as the authors point out. For an accessible historical survey 
focusing on asian aviation safety, see Gladwell 2008, ch. 7; I focus on a more recent example. 
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than others might contribute to the explanation of an accident in this case. What 
appears to be at work in this writing as well as in other public denunciations of the 
hypothesis is anxiety about reinforcing stereotypes. the important thing for our pur-
poses isn’t whether authority-deference actually did play a role, only that politically 
correct norms threaten rational analysis of the cause of a plane crash, assuming that 
public ridicule counts as a cost those analyzing such crashes must reckon with. as 
it happens, “Interviews with pilots indicate that Korean culture may have played a 
role in the crash…Captain lee told investigators that any of the three pilots on the 
plane could have decided to break off the approach, but he said it was ‘very hard’ for 
him to do so because he was a ‘low-level’ person being supervised by an instructor 
pilot.”(The New York Times 2013) the ntsb report states that “the PF’s [pilot flying’s] 
deference to authority likely played some role in the fact that he did not initiate a go-
around.”(ntsb/aar-14/01, 92)
against this, the fact that there are sources to cite discussing the role of cultural 
differences in accidents may seem to undercut the idea that there is some politically 
correct taboo surrounding the subject. but politically correct norms are graded–some 
topics are widely off-limits in public discourse, but others merely get subjected to 
“heightened scrutiny.” these introduce a filtering effect. the thought isn’t that it 
is impossible to discuss publicly the arguments involved, but knowing one will be 
subjected to moralized criticism introduces an initial barrier serving as a partial filter 
on public speech. similarly, no one thinks it was impossible to criticize the Iraq war, 
but patriots seeding suspicion of dissent in effect raised the barrier to entrants to the 
public discussion. and it’s worth observing in passing that the barrier introduced by 
stereotype-aversion extends beyond political correctness strictly speaking, to avoid-
ing stereotypes more broadly, again with worrying effects. neanderthal research, 
at least any that informs public discourse is inevitably along the lines of, “surpris-
ing new study upends stereotype that neanderthals were dim-witted.” this in itself 
might seem to reflect a random piece of scientific progress. the trouble is that it is 
difficult to imagine an article title, let alone a newspaper headline, along the lines of 
“neanderthals: as dumb as we thought.” such research would thus need to overcome 
both bias in favor of novelty and the quasi-politically correct bias against saying any-
thing nasty about the underdog (whom the extinct presumably exemplify).
Backfire: other conflicts are internal to the concerns the community has for 
those marginalized, particularly conflicts arising between the public-facing desire not 
to insult or offend, on the one hand, and the substantive concern actually to advance 
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people’s interests on the other. We see this in the case of patriotism when jingois-
tic zeal interferes with frank and open attempts to improve the life of the country. 
Dissent in war is the obvious case, but there are many others, as when critics on the 
right refuse to accept “revisionist” histories that attempt to wrestle with an ugly past 
so as to improve national culture, or when national pride leads to a denial that core 
values are being undermined by various policies. these conflicts represent a set of 
norms backfiring against those who apply them so that the core-values the norms 
emerged from are actually undermined as a net result. Politically correct backfiring 
includes pressure for trigger warnings in courses and attendant pressure to leave off 
“sensitive” materials from the syllabus that may upset students who have been trau-
matized. this has the predictable consequence that instructors are less likely to teach 
material relevant to topics like sexual violence, with the unintended consequence of 
decreasing knowledge of relevant law that might be used to protect women: “asking 
students to challenge each other in discussions of rape law has become so difficult 
that teachers are starting to give up on the subject” leading instructors to omit “rape 
law in their courses, arguing that it’s not worth the risk of complaints of discomfort 
by students.”(suk 2014)
the so-called mismatch hypothesis concerning american-style affirmative 
action furnishes another example of the costs of political correctness. (For an over-
view, see sander and taylor 2012.) once again, my point does not turn on whether 
the empirical claim is true; as with any social science work, there is bound to be some 
controversy and my goal isn’t to establish the validity of a particular scientific claim. 
but according to a significant body of research, affirmative action does immense 
damage to the “beneficiaries” of the program by tending to shift students from ac-
ademic environments in which they might well flourish toward harsher, more de-
manding environments for which they may not be as well prepared, and in which 
they consequently do worse. the main problem appears to occur not at the higher 
echelon of elite institutions, but in somewhat less selective schools, who as a result 
of an under-supply of suitable students are left with fewer and fewer candidates, as 
those there are get scooped up by the more elite schools. Diversity-pressure at higher 
echelons, in other words, is said to have disastrous consequences at lower echelons 
that fill their ranks with candidates who would benefit more at less selective institu-
tions. these benefits are said to include better grades, greater learning, better bar-
exam results, greater likelihood of going into the sciences, and better careers. For 
example, following the natural experiment introduced by California’s proposition 
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209 barring affirmative action, the number of african-american and Hispanic fresh-
men who went on to graduate in four years rose 55% and the number who went on to 
get a steM degree in four years rose 51%. (sander and taylor 2012 p.154)
obviously, it is reasonable to wonder whether the benefits of being admitted to 
an elite institution outweigh the benefits of ending up at a less elite but better “fit” 
institution, or how common such dilemmas really are, and so on. but a body of aca-
demic research had accumulated that this might be so by the early 2010s. according 
to this work, there were large net benefits to attending a school for which students 
were well prepared academically instead of a fancier school in which they were more 
likely to struggle. this research had a reasonable hypothesis as its target, was per-
formed by multiple, well-respected faculty at prominent institutions and was pub-
lished in serious, peer-reviewed journals. nevertheless, there was (and is) a profound 
resistance to taking any of this research seriously, despite the fact that it purported 
to show that a set of policies was backfiring so as to cause the community to fail to 
achieve its own aims.7 at Duke, research showed that non-asian minorities tended 
to self-select out of the hard sciences because of poor performance as a consequence 
of mismatch, but instead of prompting corrective action, school officials reacted with 
lukewarm affirmations of academic freedom, and the comment that “We understand 
how the conclusions of the research paper can be interpreted in ways that reinforce 
negative stereotypes.” (lange et al. 2012 ) any sense that there was powerful evidence 
that our policies might be irrational (in the formal sense that they caused us to act 
contrary to our own self-given aims) was (and still is) almost entirely absent. and at 
the second order, the authors received the scathing denunciations characteristic of 
political correctness, including at campus protests, signaling that research into what 
would promote the substantive interests of historically oppressed groups would not 
be tolerated if the results conflicted with norms against insult and offense.
I am not claiming that universities and public intellectuals were wrong, all things 
considered, to ignore or deny this research. We have seen that there are legitimate 
reasons to adopt a default norm of straight-arming ideas tending to insult the status 
of marginalized groups. the point is rather that doing so comes with costs, setting up 
a dilemma. My central contention isn’t that we ought to do away with the supposed 
superficial moralism of political correctness, but rather that we ought to focus instead 
7.  For a striking illustration, see the high-profile public debate on the subject “affirmative action 
on Campus Does more Harm than Good” (Intelligence squared Us), widely available online. 
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on the dilemmas political correctness introduces, and face up to the costs incurred in 
being gored on either horn.
norM-DePenDent resPonses anD reVerse-HYPoCrIsY
It is difficult to tally up or even to compare the costs of having or not having po-
litically correct norms, but it is clear that both can be high. to dwell on the costs of 
enforcing them, in a high-cost scenario they can lead to what timur Kuran calls wide-
spread “preference falsification” in which what people believe in private becomes in-
creasingly detached from what is spoken in public, which in the case of east-bloc 
communism made it impossible to discuss pervasive dysfunctions urgently requiring 
reform. Worse, Kuran identifies an “intergenerational process through which the un-
thinkable becomes the unthought,” making such dysfunctions unidentifiable even 
if they could be discussed. (Kuran 1995 ch.13 and p.186) alternatively, loury points 
out that preference falsification can lead to polarization, by a process analogous to 
Gresham’s law, whereby the bad money (extreme opinion consonant with politically 
correct ideology or else violently opposed to it) drives out the good (moderately het-
erodox opinion), and so comes to dominate what circulates in public. (loury 1996 
pp.435-6)
this is the high-cost scenario for political correctness. We can illustrate it in 
the arena of distributive justice, which offers ample scope for the relevant norms. 
attributing poor social outcomes to factors external to the person (to society, the 
state, etc.) sounds “nice,” since we don’t feel like we’re blaming the underdog for their 
already unpleasant position; attributing them to factors internal to the person (e.g., to 
poor choices) sounds “mean” and is likely to trigger charges of “blaming the victim.” 
this makes the latter less politically correct. and on the international stage, claiming 
that poor countries are in part worse off due to endogenous factors like institutions 
or culture similarly has a un-PC quality to it that blaming multinational corporations 
or the rich countries does not. since there is a long and ugly history of rich countries 
invading poor countries and an even longer history of richer citizens taking advan-
tage of poorer citizens in politics, law and business, it isn’t unreasonable to accept 
a norm discouraging theories threatening to undermine the status of the poor. but 
against this, if it turns out that people are capable of significantly influencing social 
outcomes in the course of educational, fertility or work decisions, and that absent 
these, statist policies are likely to be ineffective, it will be disastrous for such facts 
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not to inform public discourse, or for them to face ridicule. (similarly in the interna-
tional variant.) the high-cost scenario in these cases, then, is one in which there is 
a widespread belief that, say, social pathologies play an important role in explaining 
bad social outcomes, but there is reluctance to discuss that belief; or in which the 
thought doesn’t seem even a live option to many (it’s “unthought”); or that damag-
ing polarization sets in because those with moderate views face penalties for voicing 
their opinions in the public arena (“Most people can exercise significant influence on 
whether they end up poor and should be criticized for not doing so positively, but of 
course violence-prone slums or abandoned rural areas are another story”).
this high-cost scenario seems to me more than overblown fear-mongering, 
though it would be difficult to establish the extent to which it is or may be realized. 
Instead, let me make two specific suggestions about how to think about the costs on 
either side of the ledger. on the one side, there is a curious problem that arises when 
one is concerned to promulgate norms so as to avoid insult or offense, but those very 
norms play a role in shaping the nature of the insult or offense. In Germany americans 
are sometimes referred to as “amis,” short for amerikaner (not the French term). 
suppose a headmaster notices that this expression is used of a small minority of ex-
patriot students who are sometimes bullied. In sympathy, the headmaster forbids 
what he sees as a possibly condescending use of “ami,” insisting instead on the full 
“amerikaner,” and goes on to lecture students on how to treat their foreign guests. Is 
this the proper remedy for oppressed ex-patriots? It may be, and the old-fashioned ap-
proach of telling the ex-pats to buck up and pay no mind to the rotten kids may turn 
out to be ineffective or cruel. but the danger is that the headmaster’s sympathetic 
norm itself sensitizes the ex-pats to what they formerly paid little mind to, but now 
interpret as major offenses that they ought to dwell on, talk about, feel traumatized 
by, and so on. a parent might reasonably judge the headmaster’s approach a mistake, 
once the subtle point about the feedback loop implicit in such norms is recognized. 
In promulgating norms designed to benefit marginalized groups we both help and 
hurt them.
there is ample empirical evidence for this idea in relation to serious trauma. 
Victims of sexual abuse and combat veterans fare worse the more they see their trau-
matic event as a central, defining moment; norms tending to downplay the importance 
of the event would thus be expected to help. (robinaugh and Mcnally 2011) a New 
England Journal of Medicine piece on victimhood and resilience points out that imme-
diate counseling after trauma, which tends to highlight that the victims are victims 
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who should be expect to feel traumatized, often seems to make things worse, increas-
ing the likelihood of mental disorders.8 Given all this, we must be cautious in think-
ing about how to assess the costs of having or not having some norm that superfi-
cially promotes some victimized groups’ interests; assessing the overall effects is far 
from straightforward.
on the other side of the ledger, an important metric to pay attention to (and which 
social scientists could attempt to measure) is the prevalence of reverse hypocrisy. this 
is the practice of applying high standards in one’s private life, especially toward one’s 
children or other loved ones, while publicly promulgating low standards for others, 
either explicitly or by withholding public criticism. reverse hypocrisy is evidence of 
something like Kuran’s preference falsification. the savvy communist party member 
publicly signals agreement with low standards for productivity, urging that the state 
should provide for everyone’s needs without anyone doing “extra” work not officially 
assigned to him; but privately he urges his kids to work long hours in the informal 
sector and to accumulate savings. examples closer to home include private insistence 
on personal responsibility in domains like fertility decisions or work ethos, while 
ignoring or even mocking these as public norms. In this sense, it’s reverse hypocrisy 
to make it clear that you expect your children to make sensible decisions about family 
and to work hard in school whatever the excuses they are tempted to make, while 
criticizing or lampooning old-fashioned sounding public norms to the same effect.
It might be objected that there are substantive reasons to uphold different stan-
dards in the public arena than in the personal. a liberal tolerance for differences or 
even just politeness might seem to dictate as much, and of course if one judges that 
others are less fortunate in their capacity for making the relevant discriminations, 
or are less well positioned to act on them, it may seem inappropriate to uphold what 
would be unreasonable standards. arguments from liberal toleration or etiquette 
are less persuasive, though, when the stakes include the wellbeing of someone else’s 
family. and the view that we or those close to us can adhere to high standards that 
will promote our wellbeing but they cannot, has a worrying ring of condescension. 
short of extreme circumstances, many successful families simply will not tolerate 
children doing poorly in school (let alone not finishing), making poor fertility deci-
sions, or failing to work. but many of the same people are reluctant to assert these as 
public norms or to issue criticisms based on them. since asserting such norms would 
8.  Wessely 2005. For philosophical reflection on our propensity to underestimate resilience in the 
face of trauma, see Moller 2007. 
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often involve criticizing marginalized groups–those on the receiving end of such crit-
icism would almost by definition be worse off–this sort of reluctance looks like a good 
measure of political correctness, and its prevalence would be a useful barometer of 
what I call the high-cost scenario.
Is PolItICal CorreCtness a MYtH?
Given the many examples cited up to this point, it may seem surprising that 
some have doubted whether political correctness exists at all, at least to any signifi-
cant extent. but writers have in fact expressed two kinds of doubt along these lines.9 
one is the denial that there are socially significant instances of public speech being 
shaped in the ways I have outlined, so that it is denied that public speech about race 
or gender say is subject to anti-marginalizing norms to any significant extent. the 
other form that denial takes is insisting that, while there really are norms informing 
this discourse, these aren’t motivated by the kinds of concerns I have singled out. If it 
turns out that “political correctness” is just the neutral struggle for truth and justice 
that the recalcitrant wish to rebrand and demonize, then perhaps the phenomenon 
is, once again, a kind of myth. (there is a tendency to combine these two forms of 
denial, but notice that they are inconsistent and so we should stick with one or the 
other.)
Presumably we can demonstrate that X exerts a non-trivial influence on public 
discourse by showing that the discussion of major social institutions is in part shaped 
by X. It should be sufficient to dispel doubts about the existence of political correct-
ness that we demonstrate non-trivial instances of public discourse being subjected to 
its influence. and it seems to me that we have seen ample evidence that this condi-
tion is satisfied. Immigration laws are important social institutions. so are univer-
sity admission policies and government investigative agencies. In each instance, as 
we have seen, there have been non-trivial exertions of influence by powerful entities 
such as university administrators and members of the press in order to shape discus-
sion of the relevant issues. that just is political correctness, provided it is motivated 
in the way I have defined the phrase. there may be reasonable disagreement about 
how much political correctness there is (compare: “exactly how much jingoism or 
9.  they include an anonymous reviewer, Feldstein 1997, Wilson 1995, and Fish 1994, in varying 
degrees. the latter three are responding to culture-war polemics from the right (e.g., Feldstein 1997, 
116-120, Wilson 1995, 10-15, Fish 1994, 53-79), not careful analysis like loury’s, and so their doubts 
should perhaps be taken in that light.
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sexism is there?”), or whether it is a major concern in the grand scheme of things 
(“Compared to all the other problems in the world, how bad is jingoism or sexism?”). 
but we shouldn’t move from views about how important, exactly, political correct-
ness is to denying its existence outright.
alternatively, there is the suggestion that what is deemed political correctness is 
just a pejoratively described, politically neutral attempt to fight for truth and justice. 
but on reflection, this too succumbs to the evidence assembled up this point. the 
problem is that the entities seeking to influence public discourse seem specifically 
motivated to defend historically oppressed or marginalized groups and not other 
kinds of groups. thus, if the objections to works like the The Bell Curve were rooted in 
neutral concerns about shoddy science, we would expect to see symmetrical concern 
for claims about inferiority and superiority, and among those that are supposedly 
inferior, similar concern for historically oppressed and historically dominant groups. 
but as noted earlier, that is not the case. Findings of high IQ scores among ashkenazi 
Jews do not produce the same degree of social anguish and institutional ostracism, 
and no one is worried by the implication that gentiles are inferior. this doesn’t show 
the scientific objections aren’t correct–I am not drawing the invalid inference that 
because outrage was triggered by political correctness, therefore charges of shoddy 
science are wrong or can be dismissed. let us just assume all of the scientific objec-
tions were correct. the point is that there’s a distinctive concern for the status of 
oppressed and marginalized groups at work here, not that such motivations cannot 
serve to uncover the truth. a similar symmetry-test applied to the other cases dis-
cussed produces similar results. University officials urging us to refer to illegal aliens 
as “undocumented citizens” make similar suggestions concerning other marginal-
ized groups, we noted, not concerning dominant groups who might be deemed mis-
labeled. those concerned about the role of stereotypes in causal explanations aren’t 
symmetrically concerned to stamp out stereotypes about dominant groups. nor is 
any of this surprising. It would, if anything, be strange if a well-meaning public failed 
to have some norms about public discourse concerning historically marginalized 
members. as long as the public does, we should expect these kinds of asymmetric 
norms which, as I have argued, have legitimate ends but also pose difficult dilemmas.
Pressing on such asymmetries may seem misguided if there are real differenc-
es between the cases. Discourse that suggests that historically marginalized people 
somehow deserve to be marginalized is obviously harmful in a way that insulting 
dominant groups is not. It is no wonder that we respond differently to these differ-
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ent cases, we may think, which involve harms that can hardly be compared. this, 
however, is to make my point for me. the differences involved are precisely those that 
make for political correctness. to say that “it’s different” when what is at stake is the 
public standing of a group that has been persistently wronged in the past is just to 
say that it’s different when it’s politically incorrect. this is what I have tried to argue 
all along.
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